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ABSTRACT
In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting
effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules
facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger
non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation
payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation.
The  paper  also  examines  how  governance  influences  an  alternative  metric  of  not-for-profit
performance  ￿ the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with
intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks.
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  In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state on 
insiders in providing for effective governance of firms?   Ownership patterns may well substitute 
for legal protections complicating direct inferences on the efficacy of legal and reporting 
requirements.  The not-for-profit sector is characterized by the absence of owners but the 
presence of legal and reporting rules.  Indeed, the differentiating characteristic of not-for-profits 
is the legal constraint on the non-distribution of earnings to insiders.  Additionally, reporting of 
various kinds – mandated by the government rather than the owners – is also required.  The 
strength of these legal and reporting rules vary by state within the U.S. creating the opportunity 
to analyze the efficacy of legal and reporting rules in a setting without owners and without the 
complicating features of cross-country studies.      
  This paper analyzes the influence of state-varying legal and reporting rules on the 
behavior of public charities and private foundations from 1987 to 2000.  If these entities are 
motivated purely by altruistic motives or if the rules themselves are ineffective, these governance 
constraints may have no effect on not-for-profit outcomes.  Alternatively, some aspects of these 
governance constraints might constrain not-for-profit managers from exploiting the latitude 
afforded by the absence of owners and thereby improve firm performance.  In order to consider 
these alternatives, we calculate a state-level index of the legal and reporting constraints facing 
not-for-profits.  For legal constraints, we create an index of legal rules facing not-for-profits that 
is further subdivided into indices measuring explicit rules that strengthen the non-distribution 
constraint and more general, alternative enforcement mechanisms.  For reporting rules, we create 
an index of reporting requirements allowing us to consider the role of both legal rules and 
reporting requirements in influencing not-for-profit behavior.         
In order to assess the relevance of the governance environment to not-for-profit firms, 
these indices are related to measures of operating performance and insider compensation for 
public charities.  The paper also analyzes the degree to which payouts by nonoperating 
foundations also vary with these governance metrics.  Finally, the paper provides an alternative 
test of not-for-profit performance – the degree to which not-for-profits provide social insurance 
by building stocks of reserves and responding to local negative income shocks – and examines 
the effect of governance on firm performance through this test.  Much as the efficiency of private   3
firms is measured by their responsiveness to investment opportunities, this test capitalizes on the 
idea that not-for-profits should expand activity at times when their activity is most warranted – 
that is, do they help when helping helps the most. 
We find that the governance environment of not-for-profits is associated with differential 
performance by public charities and private foundations on several different margins.  For public 
charities, the analysis demonstrates that stronger non-distribution constraints and reporting rules 
are associated with a greater fraction of expenditures devoted to charitable activities and a lower 
probability of undertaking inefficient fundraising activity.  In addition to these effects on public 
charity behavior, stronger legal and reporting rules are also associated with lower insider 
compensation.  With respect to private foundations, stronger non-distribution constraints and 
reporting rules are associated with larger payouts and a lower probability of delaying required 
payouts.  As with public charities, stronger legal and reporting rules are associated with lower 
officer compensation relative to total expenses as well as to the pay of other employees for 
private foundations.   
Finally, not-for-profits in states with stronger legal and reporting rules also 
intertemporally smooth resources more by attenuating the link between the raising of resources 
and charitable expenditures.  This intertemporal smoothing appears to fulfill a social insurance 
objective as not-for-profits in states with stronger legal and reporting rules also respond to 
negative income shocks with greater activity.  These results suggest that not-for-profits in states 
with stricter governance environments fulfill a social insurance objective more effectively.    
In general, governance laws related to the non-distribution constraint and state level 
reporting requirements have the most influence on not-for-profit behaviors while more 
ambiguous legal rules associated with enforcement appear to have little effect.  More 
specifically, disclosure and reporting rules are most effective in deterring excessive insider 
compensation while the non-distribution constraint is most effective in focusing activities toward 
charitable purposes.  As hypothesized in the literature, these results suggest that the strength of 
the non-distribution constraint specifically is a critical factor in regulating the behavior of not-
for-profit organizations and that disclosure requirements can also deter opportunistic insiders.  In 
sum, stronger non-distribution constraints and reporting rules increase the fraction of overall   4
expenditures dedicated to charitable causes, mitigate large expenditures on officer compensation, 
and help ensure the efficient provision and timing of not-for-profit activity.    
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
motivates our empirical methodology.  Section 3 discusses the data employed with particular 
emphasis on the indices of governance employed in the paper.  Section 4 provides the results.  
Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Related literature and empirical methodology 
  This analysis of the governance of not-for-profits is related to the growing literature on 
the economic functioning of not-for-profits and the extensive literature on social insurance 
mechanisms.   
2.1.  The Economics of Not-For-Profits 
Analyses of not-for-profit firms typically consider why particular economic activities are 
undertaken by not-for-profit firms.  This literature emphasizes that not-for-profit firms are 
distinctive primarily because of the non-distribution constraint and that this constraint can lead to 
efficient provision by these entities in some sectors.  The intuition of Hansmann (1980), as 
expressed in models of asymmetric information (Easley and O’Hara (1982)) or ex-post 
expropriation (Glaeser and Shleifer (2004)), suggests that sectors characterized by the inability to 
contract fully over quality will feature not-for-profit firms.  The available evidence on the sectors 
where not-for-profits are most active is consistent with this interpretation.     
These analyses are helpful in considering what types of activities are undertaken by not-
for-profits but provide limited guidance on analyzing the dynamics of not-for-profit activities. Of 
course, understanding the dynamics of not-for-profit firms is critical to any assessment of the 
performance of not-for-profits, particularly as it relates to the role of governance.  One exception 
to this is the view that, without owners and a traditional for-profit governance framework, not-
for-profit organizations evolve into worker cooperatives where worker preferences, particularly 
elite worker preferences, determine activities.  This view is framed within the context of not-for-
profit hospitals in Pauly and Redisch (1973) and extended to other settings in Glaeser (2003).
1  
                                                 
1 The public finance literature has emphasized the responsiveness of contributions to taxes rather than the nature of 
the entity-level treatment of not-for-profits.  See Bittker and Rahdert (1976) for a history of the exemption of not-
for-profit and Hines (1998) for a discussion of the tax treatment of taxable income earned by not-for-profits.     5
In parallel with this economics literature, a growing literature in the accounting field has 
examined the reporting behavior of not-for-profits.
2     
In addition to the relevant literature on not-for-profit firms, our analysis also frames not-
for-profit firms within the larger literature on social insurance mechanisms.  This large literature 
typically emphasizes programs that are explicitly designed to provides insurance, such as 
unemployment insurance (as in Hamermesh (1982) or Gruber (1997)), and their effects in 
allowing recipients to smooth consumption.  The intuition of social insurance has been extended 
to the mechanisms that are operative between and within families (as in Hayashi, Altonji, and 
Kotlikoff (1995)) or through the progressivity of the tax code (as in Auerbach and Feenberg 
(2000) and Kniesner and Ziliak (2004)).  While Cochrane (1991) alludes to the role of not-for-
profits in smoothing consumption, we are unaware of any empirical efforts that conceptualize 
not-for-profits in this way.  This is surprising given the large literature, summarized in Rose-
Ackerman (1996), on the altruistic motives behind the donations that fund most not-for-profits.  
As described below, one of the tests we employ to assess the quality of not-for-profit 
performance is their level of intertemporal resource smoothing and their responses to negative 
local income shocks.     
Finally, this examination of the governance environment of not-for-profits parallels the 
growing literature on the impact of legal and reporting rules on for-profit firm performance.  As 
in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and subsequent work in the law and finance literature, these 
efforts can emphasize cross-country differences in legal rules or, as in Bushman, Piotroski and 
Smith (2004), differences in accounting procedures.  As Shleifer and Vishny (1996) note, 
ownership patterns themselves can embody responses to weak legal rules; in this sense, 
examining not-for-profits where owners are absent allows us to examine how legal and reporting 
rules alone influence firm performance.  In emphasizing within-country differences, this paper 
may be closest in spirit to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) who create firm-specific measures 
of governance and link these governance measures to subsequent firm performance.  This effort 
can be considered an effort to import the emphasis on quantifiable measures of governance to the 
                                                 
2 For example, Baber, Daniel, and Roberts (2002) find that not-for-profit managerial compensation is at least 
partially explained by variations in the relative performance of the not-for-profit suggesting that the pay-for-
performance relationship documented in the for-profit sector is also present in the not-for-profit sector.  Krishnan, 
Yetman, and Yetman (2004) find that not-for-profit managers opportunistically report their accounting results so as 
to attract higher levels of donations and to appear more “charitable” to regulators.   6
fields of not-for-profit enterprises.  The most closely related paper on not-for-profits is Fisman 
and Hubbard (2003) that links several attorney general powers as measured in 1977 to the 
endowment characteristics of not-for-profits. 
2.2.  Empirical Methodology 
The nearly $1 trillion in assets in the not-for-profit sector are deployed by two types of 
firms – private foundations and public charities – that, in aggregate, are equally sized.  While 
both types of entities are §501(c)(3) organizations providing them with a differentiating tax 
status, they are distinguished by the number of funders and some legal requirements.  
Specifically, private foundations are typically funded by a relatively small number of individuals, 
are required to pay out at least five percent of their assets regularly, are subject to a tax on net 
investment income, and typically make disbursements to public charities. Public charities are 
either those entities whose financial support is provided by the general public or the broad 
classes of educational, medical, and associated supporting organizations that are specifically   
accorded public charity status through the Internal Revenue Code.  In part, the minimal payout 
requirement for private foundations is designed to prevent the creation of foundations for purely 
tax-minimizing purposes.
3   
In order to assess the efficacy of these governance rules, we separately consider the 
effects of our measures of state-level governance (described in detail below) on public charities 
and private foundations.  For public charities, the sample consists of approximately 52,000 firm-
year observations from 1987 to 2000. Our tests emphasize three margins on which poor 
performance within not-for-profit performance may be measured– the focus on charitable 
activities, the efficiency of fundraising, and the level of insider compensation.
4  In order to 
consider the degree to which public charities are focused on charitable purposes (rather than 
administrative or fundraising expenses), we analyze the relationship between legal and reporting 
rules and the ratio of charitable expenses to total expenses and the ratio of charitable expenses to 
total revenues.  Fundraising activities, rather than serving to effectively raise funds, can serve the 
interests of insiders through extensions of social networks and the consumption of perquisites.  
                                                 
3 See Marsh (2002) for a discussion of the historic rationale for the distinction between private foundations and 
public charities.   
4 Of course, these measures of performance are largely efficiency metrics.  The social insurance mechanism we 
outline below provides a more nuanced notion of performance.     7
Accordingly, we also analyze an indicator variable intended to measure inefficient fundraising 
activities.  An indicator variable is set equal to one if the ratio of fundraising expenses to 
donations is equal to 1.0 or greater, and zero otherwise.  An average ratio in excess of 1.0 is 
suggestive of excessive or inefficient expenditures on fundraising.  Insider compensation is the 
other margin of not-for-profit behavior emphasized in this analysis.  In order to measure 
compensation of insiders controlling the public charity, the ratios of officer compensation to total 
expenses and of officer compensation to other employee compensation are employed.
5  Neither 
of these measures are perfect measures of poor performance or excessive compensation but do 
serve to measure the degree to which elite workers within public charities are benefiting from 
firm resources through either direct compensation, inefficient fundraising or non-charitable 
expenditures. 
Turning to private foundations, the sample consists of approximately 38,000 firm-year 
observations from 1994 to 2000.  We examine the relationships between governance and 
foundation payouts and foundation managerial compensation.  The rationale for examining the 
compensation of foundation managers parallels that for public charity managers.  Foundation 
payout policies are of particular interest as they capture the degree to which foundations 
distribute what is minimally required by rules.  As the tax deduction for a contribution to a 
private foundation occurs when the foundation receives the funds rather than when it is 
eventually distributed to a public charity, rules requires minimal distribution amounts to ensure 
that foundations are not advancing purely tax avoidance through transfers of assets to 
foundations (Steuerle 1977).  Prevailing rules require that foundations meet a minimum 
distribution requirement by spending at least five percent of their assets on charitable grants or 
charitable administrative expenditures in the current or following year (§4942). The minimum 
distribution requirement has been the subject of considerable controversy, with public charity 
advocacy groups calling for increases in the percentage of assets that must be annually paid out 
while foundation groups defend the current rules.
6   
                                                 
5 Officers compensation includes any amounts (wages, benefits, bonuses, etc.) paid to employees who have decision 
control over a not-for-profit’s operations or finances.   
6 See Cambridge Associates (2000) and Mehrling (1999).  Brody (1997) examines the broader questions of whether 
the non-profit sector should even have an endowment, whether this endowment should be controlled by private 
foundations instead of public charities, and whether private foundations should be allowed to exist in perpetuity.  
Hansmann (1990) criticizes the accumulation of wealth by universities on grounds of inter-generational equity.   8
Our first measure of foundation payout is the ratio of current year payouts to the required 
amount (i.e., five percent of assets). The current payout amount is line 8 of Part V of the IRS 
990, and the minimum required amount is line 7 of Part XI of the prior year’s IRS 990-PF.  We 
base the payout requirement on the prior year’s amount as foundations can meet their payout 
obligations in the current year or in the following year (with any excess distributions carried 
forward to the subsequent year).  Although many foundations distribute the legal minimum of 
five percent, some distribute more than is required.  Our second measure of charitable payout is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the foundation delays its payout as long as possible (i.e., 
until the following year) and zero otherwise.  This variable is the ratio of the current year payout 
(line 8 of Part V of the IRS 990) to the amount of remaining undistributed amounts left over 
from the prior year that must be distributed by the end of the current year (line 2a Column C Part 
XIII of the IRS 990-PF).  By systematically delaying its payout, a foundation can retain its assets 
longer.          
Finally, the conceptualization of not-for-profits firms as providing social insurance is 
tested using methods drawn from the financial economics literature.  Typically, tests of the 
efficiency of investment, as in the setting of conglomerates, employ proxies for investment 
opportunities, typically industry q, to assess whether firm investment is responding to relevant 
opportunities.  In the not-for-profit setting, the intuition of social insurance suggests that activity 
should increase in response to negative economic shocks when the marginal productivity of not-
for-profit activities becomes greatest.
7  Said another way, not-for-profits fulfilling their mission 
should disproportionately respond during distressed times as this is when their investment 
opportunities are the greatest.  Accordingly, we test if not-for-profits respond differentially to 
local economic shocks depending on their governance environment. 
This test of the efficiency of not-for-profit activity has several advantages.  First, it 
provides a measure of performance that is not entirely cost-driven in a setting where output is 
hard to measure.  Second, the intuition of investment opportunities corresponds to the espoused 
goals of a variety of not-for-profits.  Of course, such a test is a reduced form of a fuller model.  
Such a model conceives of not-for-profit firms intertemporally smoothing activity in response to 
                                                 
7 Alternatively, the concavity of utility functions provides the same intuition.  That is, not-for-profits that best 
internalize the utility functions of their customers will expand activity during periods when marginal utility is 
highest.     9
investment opportunities and this responsiveness is muted by the principal-agent problem that 
exists between funders and managers.  Such a model, while beyond the scope of this paper, 
seems promising and would result in the reduced form which is tested here.    
We operationalize this notion of insurance using two empirical tests.  First, for insurance 
to be provided, there has to be some element of intertemporal smoothing where funds are 
gathered during some periods (typically economically robust ones) and saved for later periods 
when they are most effective.  In order to identify the presence of intertemporal smoothing, we 
examine how governance influences the relationship between changes in total revenue sources 
(including donations, the sales of products and services, and other income) and changes in 
charitable expenditures.  If well-governed firms are intertemporally smoothing, the governance 
variable should attenuate the relationship between the sources of funds and the disbursement of 
those funds.   
Such intertemporal smoothing need not be for purposes associated with the needs of not-
for-profit beneficiaries.  In order to examine if this intertemporal smoothing has an insurance 
component, we examine if measures of governance influence the relationship between changes 
in local economic conditions (such as disposable income, gross state product, and unemployment 
levels) and changes in charitable expenditures.  Local positive income shocks may well increase 
resource flows to not-for-profits permitting them to increase their charitable outputs.  However, 
an insurance objective would be fulfilled if a positive relationship between local economic 
conditions and charitable output would be mitigated in well-governed firms.  Said another way, 
the intertemporal smoothing identified in the first test could be characterized as insurance if this 
second test demonstrates that negative shocks are associated with increased activity for well-
governed firms. 
3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1   Governance Measures
8 
As is emphasized in the literature on not-for-profits, the governance of not-for-profits is 
split between federal and state authorities.  At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service is 
charged with overseeing not-for-profit organizations.  Although the IRS has the ability to revoke 
                                                 
8 Our analysis of governance emphasizes legal and reporting rules.  Of course, board structure and selection can also 
be a meaningful aspect of not-for-profit governance.   10
a not-for-profits tax-exempt status in response to misbehavior, it rarely does so.  As a practical 
matter, the majority of not-for-profit oversight is provided by various state-level agencies.  
Because there is substantial variation in state-level not-for-profit legal regulation, we employ this 
variation in our empirical analysis.
 9   We use seven measures of a state’s legal power to regulate 
not-for-profits,  which naturally subdivide – one rooted in preventing expropriation of charitable 
assets by managers and the other rooted in the mechanisms through which the enforcement of 
these powers take place.  The expropriation rules are directly related to the non-distribution 
constraint.  As noted by Hansmann (1980), the non-distribution constraint is designed to prevent 
asset expropriation and it is this constraint that distinguishes the not-for-profit form of business.  
Table 1a describes the construction of the indices and the precise powers that are characterized in 
these indices.            
In the absence of oversight by either stockholders or the capital market, not-for-profit 
managers can divert charitable assets toward themselves in many ways including non-arms-
length sales of assets, consuming perquisites, or retaining charitable assets upon dissolution.  To 
prevent expropriation, states have instituted several laws and we use the most common four as 
outlined in Fremont-Smith (2004).  First, a state can legally distinguish not for profits from for-
profit firms. By applying a unique set of statutory law to not-for-profits, a state can more easily 
act to prevent the distribution of charitable assets (i.e., residual claims) to officers, directors, or 
other specific individuals other than recipients specifically included in the organization by-laws.  
Second, states can require that liquidating distributions be made by not-for-profits only to other 
not-for-profits.  By requiring that only another not-for-profit can receive the liquidating 
distributions of another not-for-profit a state effectively limits the payment of liquidating 
distributions to insiders.  Third, states can enact laws that require that the State Attorney General 
be notified of not-for-profit asset sales.  Again, this law prevents not-for-profits from 
systematically disposing of their assets, particularly through below-market sales to officers or 
                                                 
9 We are aware of only one other paper, Fisman and Hubbard (2003), that attempts to identify and measure state-
level measures of not-for-profit governance.  Our measure of legal and reporting governance differs from their 
measure in several respects.  First, we emphasize the non-distribution constraint given the literature’s emphasis on 
this aspect of not-for-profits.  Second, our measure is based on a recent re-evaluation of state level governance 
(Fremont-Smith 2004) that updates the 1974 laws, also characterized by Fremont-Smith, used by Fisman and 
Hubbard.  Third, our measure includes several new state-varying governance measures included in the recent source 
that were not included in the prior version.  Finally, we also construct a state-level measure of reporting 
requirements.  We thank Marion Fremont-Smith for providing us with an advance copy of her publication, Fremont-
Smith (2004).   11
employees through so-called “slow liquidations.”  The fourth and final component of our non-
distribution metric is whether state law limits not-for-profits from re-incorporating as for-profit 
corporations.  This law acts to prevent charities from paying out their assets as distributions to 
new “shareholders” that could be officers, directors or non-charitable corporations. 
The mechanisms a particular state can employ to enforce its provisions over not-for-
profits also vary across states.  Some states make their enforcement authority explicit by 
instituting specific laws.  We use the most common monitoring and enforcement laws as 
contained in Fremont-Smith (2004).  First, a state can require that the Attorney General must be 
notified of any legal suits involving charities.  In this way the Attorney General is able to 
determine if there is any enforceable action that should simultaneously be undertaken.  Second, a 
state can empower parties other than the Attorney General (such as officers, directors, or other 
employees) the standing to bring legal action against a not-for-profit.  This law has the effect of 
exposing the charity to multiple sources of legal challenge.  Third, states may allow for Cy pres, 
or the authority of the courts to modify the incorporated purpose of the organization if that 
organization’s purpose became obsolete, wasteful, or otherwise impracticable.   
In addition to variation in legal rules, states are also characterized by distinctive reporting 
requirements.  These reporting requirements are applicable to organizations that solicit donations 
within the state.  Each state has from zero to nine distinct financial reporting requirements 
imposed by a registration authority.  The registration authority varies across the states, 
sometimes being the Attorney General but often is a board of charities.  Our reporting 
governance metric is a linear combination of these nine different financial reporting requirements 
that are outlined in summary in Table 1b.
10  Because it is possible that some larger organizations 
solicit donations in multiple states, our measure (which is based on the state of incorporation) 
will contain some measurement error.  To determine if this effect influences our results we 
replicated our tests eliminating organizations that filed combined IRS 990s (combined 990s 
result when a parent organization reports the aggregated financial results of the various affiliated 
state organizations) with no change in the substance of our results.        
                                                 
10 We collected these measures of various state not-for-profit reporting requirements from the Charitable 
Organization Multi-State Filing Project at www.multistatefiling.org.    12
Our nine measures of reporting requirements fall into three general categories.  The first 
category includes the two general reporting requirements of whether or not a state requires 
registration and if registration needs to be renewed annually.  The second category includes five 
types of documents that a state could require to be included in the registration.  These documents 
are the not-for-profits’ financial statements, by laws, articles of incorporation, IRS tax-exempt 
determination letter (i.e., the IRS 1023), and any additional forms the state may require.  The 
final category contains two miscellaneous items.  Some states require that a not-for-profit 
disclose the name of any paid professional fundraising organizations used.  Professional 
fundraisers frequently retain a portion of donations as a fee and remit remaining funds to 
charities.  By using professional fundraisers and reporting only net donations a charity can 
appear to be raising fewer donations in a state, perhaps drawing less regulatory attention.  
Finally, some states require that organizations that solicit donations in their jurisdiction undergo 
a financial statement audit by Certified Public Accountants.     
Tables 2a, 2b and 3 provide these legal and reporting indices, respectively, and their 
components by state.  The minimum value for the total legal index is 3 while the highest is 7 
indicating substantial variation across states.  The reporting index provides even more variation 
with some states requiring nothing and other states requiring all nine components of our 
reporting index.  Our governance sub-indices are correlated with each other as the correlation 
coefficient between the non-distribution sub-index and the enforcement sub-index is 0.37.  
Similarly, the correlation coefficient between the combined legal index and the reporting index is 
0.32.   In addition to including these three measures separately in our regression models, we also 
include various combinations of them including grouping the two legal governance metrics into a 
single legal governance measure as well as grouping all three measures into a single governance 
metric.  
3.2.   Not-for-profit Organization Data 
All public charities and foundations with revenues over $25,000 must file an IRS Form 
990 (or in the case of a foundation, a 990-PF) annually.  To ensure the wide dissemination of 
Form 990 information the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) division sponsors the Urban Institute to   13
collect the data and make it freely available on the Internet at www.guidestar.org.
11  The public 
charity dataset includes the years from 1987 to 2000.  The most recent year of our sample (2000) 
contains 15,669 observations, while the oldest (1987) contains 8,357.  Each of the annual public 
charity datasets includes all charities with assets over $10 million plus a stratified random sample 
of charities with assets less than $10 million.  This database contains 160,140 observations of 
which 65,195 are not educational (i.e., private high schools or universities) or medical (i.e., 
hospitals and medical research institutes) not-for-profits.   
We restrict our analysis to the sample of 65,195 charitable not-for-profits (and exclude all 
educational or medical not-for-profits) for two reasons.  First, these types of organizations are 
subject to several additional sources of state-level governance that are not related to the measures 
of governance we use for our analysis.  For example, in addition to being subject to the typical 
powers of a state Attorney General, medical not-for-profits are subject to oversight by state 
licensing and medical boards.  In contrast, charitable not-for-profits are regulated by a single 
state agency and their powers correspond to our governance metric.  Second, many states exempt 
educational and medical not-for-profits from the reporting requirements that we employ.  These 
exemptions are granted because medical and educational not-for-profits generally must file 
particular regulatory forms with the state agencies that oversee them.  Unfortunately, we are not 
aware of any reliable source that would permit us to construct a legal or a reporting governance 
metric for educational or medical not-for-profits.  We further reduce our sample of 65,795 
charitable not-for-profits to 51,917 by requiring that they receive donations of a least $10,000.  
Charities that receive few donations are frequently not subject to state reporting requirements 
and are less likely to be subject to enforcement efforts by state oversight agencies. 
The foundation dataset spans the years 1994 through 2000.  The 1994 database includes 
the entire population of 50,914 foundations, while the 1995 to 2000 samples include 
approximately 8,000 observations for each year.  The sample observations for 1995 to 2000 were 
compiled by the IRS and include all foundations with total year-end assets of $10 million or 
more as well as a stratified random sample of smaller foundations.  We exclude 6,909 private 
operating foundation observations, which operate charitable programs rather than make grants 
                                                 
11 Computer readable data is available from the National Center for Charitable Statistics directly at 
www.nccs.urban.org.    14
and face a different set of tax rules. We also exclude 2,654 foundation-year observations with 
zero assets.
12   
Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the paper are presented in Table 4.
13  
Although the organization-specific characteristics we examine vary from year to year, our 
governance metrics do not.  We did attempt to gain some understanding of the extent to which 
these various governance mechanisms have been stable over time, particularly during our sample 
periods.  Discussions with various individuals at various state not-for-profit regulating agencies 
suggest that in general the existing rules have been in place for at least the past several years.  
Because the governance variables do not vary across time, all standard errors are clustered at the 
entity level.  Additionally, because the charitable sector is diverse we also include industry 
indicator variables in our regression analyses.  The IRS has created a National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE) which include 18 major categories (and numerous sub-categories) of 
charitable not-for-profits.       
4. Results 
4.1.   Public Charities 
As previously discussed the empirical analysis is directed towards addressing two broad 
issues.  First, does stronger governance induce not-for-profits to focus more on charitable 
activities?  Second, does stronger governance attenuate payments (in the form of salaries) to 
insiders?  Table 5 initiates our analysis with an examination of how our governance metrics 
influence the charitable payout and fundraising activities of public charities.  Industry, size (total 
assets) and revenue controls are included in all regressions.  All t-statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level.  Several variations of each model are presented in order to 
examine the independent and joint effects of the governance variables.   
The measure of charitable payout in columns 1 through 6 is the ratio of charitable 
expenses to total expenses.  This measures captures the relative proportion of total expenditures 
                                                 
12 Zero asset foundations frequently act as little more than annual conduits where a donor provides funds to the 
foundation, which disburses those funds to a charity before the end of the year. 
13 Because the foundation sector is diverse and our sample contains observations with extreme minimum and 
maximum values of many of our variables of interest we attempt to mitigate the influence of extreme values on our 
analyses in several ways.  First, we winsorize all of our data at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles.  Second, we conduct 
extensive outlier testing in each regression model including examining residual plots and screening our data based 
on Cook’s D statistics, leverage statistics, and standardized residual statistics.     15
that are devoted to charitable causes rather than consumed as administrative expenses or spent on 
fundraising activities.
14  The results in column 1 of Table 5 indicate that the combined 
governance variable is associated with a larger share of not-for-profit expenses being dedicated 
to charitable purposes.  When we partition the combined governance variable into its three sub-
indices (non-distribution, enforcement, and reporting) in columns 2-6 of Table 5, results suggest 
that the enforcement sub-index has no independent effect on public charity behavior.  In contrast 
the non-distribution and reporting governance variables each has a statistically significant effect 
on public charity behavior.  Columns 7 through 12 of Table 5 repeat this analysis using the share 
of total revenue as a scaling factor in order to capture the relative amount of total current 
resources that are devoted to charitable purposes.  Scaling by revenues is a useful check on these 
results as a not-for-profit can spend its current inflows on charitable, administrative, or 
fundraising activities but it may alternatively choose to save a portion of those inflows.  Results 
for this alternative measure of charitable payout are similar to those obtained when scaling by 
total expenses suggesting that intertemporal dynamics or the stage of not-for-profit growth does 
not account for the observed results.  In terms of economic magnitude the results suggest that 
increasing non-distribution governance from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile (a change of 
1.0) induces an approximately one percent increase in expenses dedicated toward charitable 
purposes.  A similar magnitude applies to the results on reporting governance.  
Columns 13 through 18 of Table 5 employ a dependent variable that measures the 
efficiency of fundraising. As noted by Steinberg (1986), a not-for-profit will benefit financially 
by increasing its fundraising activities until the marginal cost of fundraising is equal to marginal 
donation revenues.
15  The fundraising metric we employ is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the ratio of fundraising expenses to total donations is equal to or greater than 1.0 and zero 
otherwise.  This average measure, although not identical to the underlying marginal metric, 
                                                 
14 We define charitable expenses as those reported as “program expenses” in Part II of Page 2 of the IRS 990.  On 
page 2 a charity must partition all of its expenses into one of three mutually exclusive categories; programs, 
administrative, and fundraising. 
15 Rose-Ackerman (1982) provides a formal analysis of the issue of “excessive” fundraising and finds that donors 
(who favor a particular type of public good) gain from fundraising to the extent it attracts other donors to their 
charity and lose to the extent that donations are diverted away from their favored charity towards alternative 
competing charities.  This substitution effect can cause waste to the extent it merely increases overall fundraising 
expenditures without increasing the amount of overall donations in the market.     16
captures the notion of “excessive” fundraising.  These specifications employ a logit model.
16  
These results indicate that the combined governance variable is associated with a lower 
probability of incurring “excessive” fundraising expenses.  When we partition the combined 
governance variable into its three sub-indices (non-distribution, enforcement, and reporting) 
results show that the enforcement sub-index has no independent effect but that the non-
distribution and reporting governance variables each has a statistically significant effect on 
fundraising, consistent with the results found for charitable expenditures above.  In terms of 
magnitudes, the results suggest that increasing non-distribution (reporting) governance from the 
25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile induces an approximately 14 (12) percent decrease in 
probability that a public charity will engage in excessive fundraising. 
The importance of the non-distribution laws and reporting laws relative to general 
enforcement variables is something that persists in our analysis.  Given that the non-distribution 
constraint is, as noted by Hansmann (1980), the differentiating characteristic of not-for-profits, 
these results are reassuring.  These laws act to prohibit specific activities such as self-dealing or 
indirect distributions.  Similarly, the state level reporting laws are designed to lay bare the 
financial transactions of the not-for-profit.  In contrast, state level laws regarding the 
enforcement powers of the state Attorney General do not correspond to specifically prohibited 
transactions or actual requirement but simply lay out what general powers the Attorney General 
has.  These more general laws appear to have no effect on the behavior of not-for-profits.     
Table 6 presents the results of tests intended to measure the effects of governance on 
insider compensation.
17  Columns 1 through 6 show the effects of the governance metrics on the 
ratio of officers’ compensation to total expenses.  This ratio captures the relative amount of total 
expenditures that are paid to officers.  Results show that the combined governance variable is not 
associated with the ratio of officers’ compensation to total expenses.  The results in subsequent 
columns (2 to 6) suggest that higher levels of reporting governance attenuate the ratio of officers’ 
compensation to total expenses, but that neither of the legal subindices has any independent 
effect.  
                                                 
16 As the descriptive statistics in Table 4 indicate, only six percent of the sample has this indicator variable set equal 
to one.  Alternative specifications that employ a cutoff of 0.8 instead of 1 reach similar conclusions.   
17 This figure is drawn from line 25 of Part II of the IRS 990 (line item description is “compensation of officers, 
directors, etc.”.     17
One problem with using the ratio of compensation to total expense is that many not-for-
profit employees, including officers, donate their services.  To the extent that the donation of 
services is correlated with governance this test is not necessarily isolating the effects of 
governance on compensation per se.  To overcome this potential weakness we use a second 
compensation metric defined as the ratio of officer’s compensation to other employee (i.e., non-
officer) compensation.  This ratio captures the relative amount of compensation that not-for-
profits officers receive relative to the other employees.  Columns 7 through 12 in Table 6 report 
results using this metric and show that  higher combined governance is associated with lower 
amounts of officer’s compensation relative to other employee compensation.  When we partition 
the combined governance variable into its three sub-indices (non-distribution, enforcement, and 
reporting) results show that the enforcement sub-index has no independent effect but that the 
non-distribution and reporting governance variables each has a statistically significant and 
independent effects.  In terms of magnitude the results suggest that increasing reporting 
governance from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile (a change of 2.0) induces an 
approximately 0.1 percent decrease in the ratio of officer’s compensation to total compensation.   
  As with charitable payout and fundraising behavior, the results suggest that laws 
regulating inappropriate distributions to insiders and reporting requirements have the strongest 
effect on officer’s compensation.  These results correspond to the intuition that excess 
compensation is deterred in the presence of laws that prohibit the distribution of assets to insiders 
and in the presence of reporting requirements the force not-for-profit managers to report their 
financials in detail.     
4.2.   Private Foundations 
The analysis of private foundations parallels that conducted on public charities.  Similar 
to public charities, foundations also make charitable payouts.  An important distinction between 
foundations and charities is that foundations have a minimum payout requirement while charities 
do not.  Again we seek to address two basic issues; does stronger governance cause foundations 
to pay out more than the minimally required amount, and does stronger governance attenuate 
payments (in the form of salaries) to insiders?  Columns 1 through 6 of Table 7 examine the 
effects of governance on the amount of foundation payouts relative to legally required minimum   18
amount of five percent of assets.
18  The results in column 1 of Table 7 show that the combined 
governance variable is associated with larger foundation payouts relative to the required amount.  
When we partition the combined governance variable into its three sub-indices (non-distribution, 
enforcement, and reporting) as in columns 2-6 of Table 7, results suggest that the non-
distribution and reporting governance variables each has a statistically significant effect on 
foundation payouts while the enforcement sub-index has no independent effect on foundation 
payouts.  These results suggest that an increase in non-distribution governance from the 25
th 
percentile to the 75
th percentile induces an approximately seven percent increase in foundation 
payouts relative to the required amount.  A somewhat smaller magnitude (four percent) applies 
to reporting governance.  
As discussed above, a foundation has two choices when making its payout decisions.  
The first choice is determining how much to payout (as examined in the columns 1 through 6 of 
Table 7) and the second choice is determining when to payout.  Because foundations are 
permitted to delay their payouts one year they can retain their assets one additional year by 
deferring their payouts.  The second six columns of Table 7 presents results using an indicator 
variable equal to one if the foundation delays the majority (i.e., 99 percent) of its payouts until 
the following year and zero otherwise.  Results suggest that higher combined governance is 
associated with a lower probability of delay in foundation payouts.  As with other results, the 
enforcement sub-index has no independent effect but the non-distribution and reporting 
governance variables each has a statistically significant and independent effects on foundation 
payout delay.  In terms of magnitude the results suggest that increasing reporting governance 
from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile induces an approximately 5 percent decrease in 
probability that a private foundation will delay its payouts as long as possible.  
With respect to foundation officers’ compensation
19, results in the first column of Table 8 
shows that higher levels of combined governance are associated with lower ratios of officers’ 
compensation to total compensation suggesting that stronger governance attenuates foundation 
officer’s compensation.  The partitioned results in columns 2 through 6 indicate that this effect 
stems from the non-distribution sub-index and that neither the enforcement subindex nor the 
                                                 
18 The payout amount is line 8 of Part V of the IRS 990, and the minimum required amount is line 7 of Part XI of the 
prior year’s IRS 990-PF. 
19 This figures is taken from line 13a of the IRS 990-PF.   19
reporting governance measure are associated with the ratio of foundation officer’s compensation 
to total expenses.  Scaling by other employee compensation provide similar results, as indicated 
in columns 7 through 12 of Table 8.  In terms of magnitude the results suggest that increasing 
non-distribution governance from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile induces an 
approximately 3 percent decrease in the ratio of officers compensation to total expenses.  A 
similar change in non-distribution (reporting) governance induces a decrease in the ratio of 
officer compensation to other employee compensation of 37 (70) percent.  
The results for foundation payouts are similar to those for public charity payouts and 
suggest that similar forms of governance laws have similar effects on not-for-profit behavior.  
This is somewhat surprising given that private foundations are more likely to have a significant 
donor who can exert significant control.  Nonetheless, in both cases non-distribution laws and 
reporting requirements appear to be associated with higher charitable payouts in both types of 
not-for-profits.  In part, this may be explained by the fact that the oversight of many foundations 
are provided by the families of donors and, more specifically, later generations of donors with 
less incentive to fulfill the charitable mission of the foundation.  We leave this link between the 
presence of an actual donor and foundation behavior for future work. 
4.3.   Not-for-Profits and Social Insurance 
The preceding analysis is useful in establishing empirical regularities between insider 
compensation, a focus on charitable purposes and the governance environment of the not-for-
profit firms.  This analysis, however, is subject to several criticisms.  First, it does not employ the 
panel nature of the underlying data.  Indeed, the results are subject to the same criticisms leveled 
at cross-country studies that relate firm performance or capital market conditions to governance.  
Second, it only emphasizes the cost-structure of not-for-profits without attempting to assess the 
degree to which not-for-profits are fulfilling their mission.  In order to investigate further the 
importance of the governance environment on not-for-profits and to respond to these concerns, 
we turn to an analysis of whether not-for-profit firms fulfill a social insurance objective.  While 
no ready summary statistic is available to assess the performance of not-for-profits, we employ 
the panel nature of the data to assess the degree to which not-for-profits are intertemporally 
smoothing resources and if they are, indeed, helping when helps the most.  These tests, while 
novel in the setting of not-for-profits, employ the differential response to shocks to see if the   20
relationship between resources and activities and between local economic conditions and not-for-
profit activities is mediated by the governance environment.
20   
A social insurance object would be fulfilled if not-for-profits both intertemporally smooth 
resources and if they expend more resources when local economies are hardest hit.  The intuition 
for intertemporal smoothing arises from the fact that a well governed not-for-profit would opt to 
limit the expansion of its charitable expenditures in flush times in order to build a reserve that 
can be employed in future bad times.  In order to consider this possibility, Table 9 examines the 
relationship between not-for profit activities and the resources available to a not-for-profit, 
including donations, program revenues (from the sales of products and services) and revenues 
from the sales of assets.  We partition the revenue sources into these three categories because 
they are very different.  Donations are received from donors while program revenues are earned 
income.  Asset sales are neither donated nor earned, but result from the organization disposing of 
a portion of its investment or plant assets.  These three revenue categories comprise the vast 
majority (over 95 percent) of total organization revenues.  To conduct this analysis we express 
all our variables as percentage changes and include year and industry effects. 
The first two columns of Table 9 examine the link between these resources and not-for-
profit expenses for charitable purposes and shows that, as available resources from donations and 
programs increases, the amount of charitable expenditures also increases.  This finding is 
consistent with the intuition that increased resources are associated with increased expenditures.  
Results in the third column of Table 9 show that revenues from asset sales are not associated 
with increases in charitable expenditures.  One likely cause for this result is that revenues derived 
from asset sales tend to be lumpy and are therefore less likely to have an impact on charitable 
expenditures.  Of more interest than these main effects is the coefficient on the interaction of the 
governance variable and these resource variables.  Results in Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the 
presence of stronger governance attenuates the increase in charitable outputs as resources from 
donations and programs rise.  This finding is consistent with a social insurance effect in that 
charities in well governed states increase their charitable spending less as resources increase, 
saving some resources for poorer economic conditions.  In columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 9 we 
                                                 
20 Because foundations are less subject to the effects of economy wide fluctuations (as they are predominantly 
funded by a single person) and typically pursue longer-term objectives, we exclude private foundations from this 
analysis.   21
combine the measures of economic resources into single equations.  Column 4 presents the 
combined results excluding the main effect of governance while the results in Column 5 include 
the governance main effect.  The results in Column 6 also exclude the governance main effect 
but report clustered t-statistics.  In all cases, the results show an insurance effect (as noted by a 
statistically negative sign on the interaction coefficient) for program revenues.   
While these results indicate intertemporal smoothing of resources, particularly program 
revenues, it does not suggest that not-for-profits are increasing resources during economically 
difficult times.  In order to consider this relationship, we consider the relationship between 
several measures of local economic conditions and charitable expenses.  As no single measure 
best captures local needs, we employ changes in disposable income, disposable income per 
capita, gross state product, and state-level unemployment rates.  The results in columns 1, 3, 5 
and 7 in Table 10 indicate that as the overall economic situation of a state improves (as measured 
by higher state disposable income, higher state disposable income per capita, higher gross state 
product, and lower state unemployment rates) the amount of charitable expenditures by public 
charities likewise increases.  These results suggest that not-for-profits are expanding and 
contracting in tandem with local economic cycles.  When these economic variables are interacted 
with governance, the results in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 indicate that the increases in charitable 
expenditures in response to economic activity are attenuated in higher governance states.  In 
other words, not-for-profits in states providing a stricter governance environment are more likely 
to attenuate the relationship between local economic conditions and charitable expenditures, 
enabling them to provide more resources during more difficult economic times. 
These results can be viewed as supporting the view that good governance rules help not-
for-profit entities fulfill a social insurance function.  While the coefficients on the interaction 
terms are supportive of this intuition, the coefficients on the local economic variables are not 
consistent with not-for-profits, on average, providing an insurance function as conceptualized in 
this paper.  While the direct test of the effect of governance on not-for-profit is on the sign of the 
interaction term, the coefficients on the economic variables alone indicate the degree to which 
not-for-profits remain tied to local economic conditions.  Further analysis might usefully 
examine the other factors that allow not-for-profit firms to fulfill a social insurance function. 
5. Conclusion   22
The not-for-profit sector, consisting of public charities and private foundations, is a 
significant part of the U.S. economy.  Public charities face several important operating choices 
including how much financial resources to devote to charitable rather than administrative 
activities, how much to spend on fundraising, and how to compensate their officers.  Private 
foundations likewise face important choices including how much of their assets to give away to 
charities annually, when to pay those gifts, and how much to compensate their officers.  These 
choices are central and fundamental to the overall operating effectiveness of the charitable sector 
and are remarkably unconstrained by the usual mechanisms that constrain for-profit managers.  
In the absence of the governance normally provided by owners, not-for-profits are subject to 
oversight and monitoring by various state-level agencies.  Although this situation is well known, 
what is not known is how effective these legal and reporting rules are in controlling the behavior 
of not-for-profit managers.     
The governance environment facing not-for-profit firms appears to shape their emphasis 
on charitable activities, their compensation patterns, their willingness to engage in inefficient 
fundraising, and their willingness to smooth and time their activities most effectively.  These 
findings are consistent with the notion that state-level laws and regulations constitute an effective 
governance environment in the absence of owners.  The results further suggest that the more 
general enforcement provisions that outline the legal authority of state attorney generals have 
little or no effect on not-for-profit firm behavior while specific rules that strengthen the non-
distribution constraint or mandate fuller reporting provide the largest effects on not-for-profit 
behavior.  Finally, our analysis finds that strong governance rules also appear to enhance the 
willingness of not-for-profits to intertemporally smooth their activities and expand activities 
when local economic conditions worsen.  This finding is suggestive of a social insurance 
function for not-for-profits as well-governed entities moderate their spending in good economic 
periods in order to expand their charitable activities in less robust economic periods.      
This analysis also suggests several lines of further inquiry.  First, the diffusion of funders 
of not-for-profits might usefully be analogized to the concentration of ownership to examine how 
not-for-profit firms respond to the presence of large funders.  One possible avenue for this would 
be to consider the role of government grants, or large block grants received from feeder 
organizations such as the United Way.  Second, the effects of large liquid endowments on 
charitable behavior, analogous to the free cash flow problem encountered in for-profit   23
corporations, is a relatively unexplored area.  Third, the extent to which legacy effects alter 
private foundation payouts has not been examined.  The payout philosophy of a foundation could 
be a function of whether or not the originating founder is still alive or a function of the influence 
of the founder’s heirs on foundation payouts.  Each of these questions could be analyzed within 
the framework of the governance environment articulated in this paper.  We leave these 
questions for future research.    24
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Table 1a 
Description of Legal Governance Measures 
 
Non-distribution Sub-Index Measures 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 




from for-profit firms 
Some states have a unique set of statutory laws that apply specifically to not-for-profits.  
One common element of these separate laws is that they typically act to prevent the 
distribution of charitable assets (i.e., residual claims) to officers, directors, or other 




restricted to other not-for-
profits 
Some states require that charitable liquidating distributions be paid to other registered 
charities only.  This prevents charities from paying assets to corporate officers or 
directors or other non-charitable organizations. 
 
Attorney General must be 
notified of asset sales 
Some states require charities to notify the Attorney General if it sells substantially all of 




incorporating as a for-
profit corporation 
Some states prohibit or otherwise limit the extent to which charities can re-organize as 
for-profit corporations.  This prevents charities from paying out their assets to new 
“shareholders” which could be officers or directors or non-charitable corporations. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Enforcement Rights Sub-Index Measures 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable        Description 
 
Attorney General must be 
notified of any suits 
involving charities 
Some states require the courts to notify the Attorney General of any legal action brought 
against a charity.  One purpose of this requirement is that it permits the Attorney General 
to determine if there is any enforceable action it should undertake as well. 
Parties other than Attorney 
General have standing to 
bring legal actions 
Some states give parties other than the Attorney General (such as officers or directors) the 
right to bring legal suit against a charity.  This exposes the charity to additional sources of 
legal enforcement. 
Cy pres authority  Cy pres laws give the courts the power to modify the incorporated purpose of the 
organization if that organization’s purpose became obsolete, wasteful, or otherwise 
impracticable 
 
Source:  Fremont-Smith (2004).    28
Table 1b 
Description of Reporting Governance Measures 
 
 
Variable        Description 
 
Registration required  Most states exempt organizations that raise small amounts of donations (typically around 
$10,000).  Virtually all states exempt not-for-profit educational and medical 
organizations from registration as these types of organizations typically have their own 
state and frequently federal registration requirements. 
 
Annual renewal of 
registration 
For states that require registration the renewal period is generally either annual or never 




Some charities use professional fundraising firms which raise donations and remit those 
donations, less a fee, to the charity. 
 





In addition to the IRS 990 (which is required to be included in all state registrations) 
some states also require that financial statements be included. 
 
Bylaws included  Are bylaws included as part of required reporting? 
 
Articles of incorporation 
included 
Are articles of incorporation included as part of required reporting? 
 
Tax exempt determination 
letter included 
The tax-exempt determination letter (the IRS 1023) is the formal document that exempts 
a charity from federal income taxation. 
 
Other state specific 
information included 
Some states have additional state-specific forms that must be included in the registration. 
 
Source: Based on filing requirements as reported by the Charitable Organization Multi-State Filing Project.  Further detail is available at 
www.multistatefiling.org. 
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Table 2a 
Legal Non-distribution Governance Sub-Index 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 














Alaska 0  1  0  1  2 
Alabama 0  1  0  1  2 
Arkansas 1  1  0  0  2 
Arizona 0  1  0  1  2 
California 1  1  1  1  4 
Colorado 0  1  0  1  2 
Connecticut   0  1  0  1  2 
DC 0  1  0  1  2 
Delaware 0  0  0  1  1 
Florida 0  1  0  1  2 
Georgia 0  1  1  1  3 
Hawaii 0  0  0  1  1 
Iowa 0  1  0  1  2 
Idaho 0  1  0  1  2 
Illinois 0  1  0  1  2 
Indiana 1  1  0  0  2 
Kansas 0  1  0  1  2 
Kentucky 0  1  0  1  2 
Louisiana 0  1  0  1  2 
Massachusetts 0  1  1  1  3 
Maryland 0  1  0  1  2 
Maine 1  1  1  0  3 
Michigan 0  1  0  1  2 
Minnesota 0  1  1  1  3 
Missouri 1  1  1  0  3 
Mississippi 0  0  0  1  1 
Montana 1  1  1  0  3 
North Carolina  0  1  1  1  3 
North Dakota  0  1  1  1  3 
Nebraska 1  1  1  0  3 
New Hampshire  0  0  0  1  1 
New Jersey  0  1  0  1  2 
New Mexico  0  1  0  1  2 
Nevada 0  1  0  1  2 
New York  1  1  1  0  3 
Ohio 0  1  0  1  2 
Oklahoma 0  0  0  1  1 
Oregon 1  1  1  1  4 
Pennsylvania 0 1  0  1 2 
Rhode Island  0  1  0  1  2 
South Carolina  1  1  1  1  4 
South Dakota  0  1  0  1  2 
Tennessee 1  1  1  0  3 
Texas 0  1  0  1  2 
Utah 0  1  0  0  1 
Virginia 0  1  0  1  2 
Vermont 1  1  1  0  3 
Washington 1  1  1  0  3 
Wisconsin 0  1  0  1  2 
West Virginia  0  1  0  0  1 
Wyoming 1  1  1  0  3   30
Table 2b 


















Alaska 0  0  0  0  2 
Alabama 0  1  1  2  4 
Arkansas 0  0  1  1  3 
Arizona 0  0  1  1  3 
California 1  1  1  3  7 
Colorado 0  1  1  2  4 
Connecticut   1  1  1  3  5 
DC 0  1  1  2  4 
Delaware 1  1  1  3  4 
Florida 0  1  1  2  4 
Georgia 1  1  1  3  6 
Hawaii 0  1  1  2  3 
Iowa 1  0  1  2  4 
Idaho 1  1  1  3  5 
Illinois 1  1  1  3  5 
Indiana 1  0  1  2  4 
Kansas 1  0  1  2  4 
Kentucky 0  0  1  1  3 
Louisiana 1  0  1  2  4 
Massachusetts 1  1  1  3  6 
Maryland 0  1  1  2  4 
Maine 0  0  1  1  4 
Michigan 1  1  1  3  5 
Minnesota 1  1  1  3  6 
Missouri 1  1  1  3  6 
Mississippi 1  1  1  3  4 
Montana 1  1  1  3  6 
North Carolina  1  1  1  3  6 
North Dakota  1  1  1  3  6 
Nebraska 1  1  1  3  6 
New Hampshire  0  0  1  1  2 
New Jersey  1  1  1  3  5 
New Mexico  0  0  1  1  3 
Nevada 1  1  1  3  5 
New York  1  1  1  3  6 
Ohio 1  1  1  3  5 
Oklahoma 1  1  1  3  4 
Oregon 1  1  1  3  7 
Pennsylvania 1  1  1  3  5 
Rhode Island  1  0  1  2  4 
South  Carolina 1 1  0 2  6 
South Dakota  1  0  1  2  4 
Tennessee 1  1  1  3  6 
Texas 1  1  1  3  5 
Utah 1  0  1  2  3 
Virginia 1  0  1  2  4 
Vermont 1  1  1  3  6 
Washington 1  0  1  2 5 
Wisconsin 1  1  1  3  5 
West Virginia  0  0  1  1  2 
Wyoming 1  1  1  3  6 
   31
Table 3 
Reporting Governance Index 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 




Alaska  159  1 1  1 1 1  0  0  0  0  5 
Alabama  474  1 0  0 0 1  1  1  1  0  5 
Arkansas  176  1 1  1 1 0  0  0  1  1  6 
Arizona  472  1 1  1 0 0  0  0  0  0  3 
California  5,121  1 1  0 0 1  1  1  1  0  6 
Colorado  812  1 1  1 0 0  0  0  0  0  3 
Connecticut    1,060  1 0  0 1 1  0  0  0  0  3 
DC  1,464  1 1  1 0 1  1  1  1  0  7 
Delaware  218  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Florida  2,007  1 1  1 0 0  0  0  1  0  4 
Georgia  843  1 1  0 1 1  0  0  1  1  6 
Hawaii  271  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Iowa  529  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Idaho  61  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Illinois  2,244  1 0  1 1 1  1  1  1  0  7 
Indiana  1,045  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Kansas  457  1 1  0 1 1  0  1  1  0  6 
Kentucky  529  1 1  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  2 
Louisiana  383  1 0  1 0 0  1  1  0  0  4 
Massachusetts 1,691  1 0  0 1 1  1  1  1  0  6 
Maryland  987  1 1  1 1 1  1  1  1  0  8 
Maine  275  1 1  0 1 1  0  0  1  0  5 
Michigan  1,267  1 1  1 1 1  1  1  1  0  8 
Minnesota  1,079  1 1  1 1 0  0  1  1  0  6 
Missouri  911  1 1  1 0 1  0  0  1  1  6 
Mississippi  202  1 1  1 1 1  1  1  1  1  9 
Montana  122  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
North  Carolina 1,340  1 1  1 0 1  1  1  1  1  8 
North  Dakota  104  1 1  1 1 1  0  1  0  2  8 
Nebraska  324  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
New  Hampshire 274  1 1  0 0 1  1  1  1  1  7 
New  Jersey  1,227  1 1  1 1 1  1  1  1  0  8 
New  Mexico  150  1 0  1 1 1  0  1  1  0  6 
Nevada  93  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
New  York  5,482  1 0  0 1 1  1  1  1  0  6 
Ohio  2,474  1 1  0 0 1  1  1  1  0  6 
Oklahoma  435  1 1  1 0 1  0  0  0  0  4 
Oregon  449  1 0  0 0 1  1  1  1  0  5   32
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Pennsylvania  2,850  1 1  0 1 1  1  1  1  0  7 
Rhode  Island  308  1 1  1 1 1  0  0  0  1  6 
South  Carolina  411  1 1  1 0 1  0  0  0  0  4 
South  Dakota  193  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Tennessee  719  1 1  1 1 1  1  1  1  2  10 
Texas  2,055  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Utah  102  1 1  1 1 0  1  1  1  1  8 
Virginia  1,363  1 1  1 1 1  1  1  1  0  8 
Vermont  160  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Washington  696  1 1  1 0 1  0  0  1  1  6 
Wisconsin  933  1 1  0 1 1  1  1  1  0  7 
West  Virginia  179  1 0  1 1 0  0  0  1  1  5 
Wyoming  89  0 0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0   33
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Public Charities and Private Foundations 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable: Mean  Median  25%  75%  Std.Dev 
Governance Variables:         
   Non-distribution governance  2.51  2.00  2.00  3.00  0.76 
   Enforcement governance  3.44  4.00  3.00  4.00  0.83 
   Reporting governance  5.62  6.00  5.00  7.00  2.46 
         
Charitable Not-for-profits:         
Charitable expenses / total expenses   0.785  0.839  0.73  0.90  0.20 
Charitable expenses / total revenues  0.676  0.734  0.49  0.86  0.29 
Fundraising indicator  0.060  0.000  0.00  0.00  0.23 
Officer compensation  / total expenses  0.059  0.032  0.01  0.06  0.08 
Officer compensation / other  
employee compensation  0.346 0.217  0.00 0.70  0.37 
Total revenues (in $millions)  13.26  4.18  1.11  11.43  47.79 
Total assets (in $millions)  29.09  11.29  2.48  25.77  86.46 
Total donation (in $millions)  6.61  1.02  0.21  4.08  27.72 
Percentage change in total donations  -0.61 0.04  -0.28  0.307 3.57 
Percentage change in program revenues  -0.20 0.06  -0.05  0.17 1.33 
Percentage change in asset sales  -0.09 0.62  -0.21  1.00  14.36 
Percentage change in state disposable income  -0.02 0.04  0.03  0.06 0.27 
Percentage change in state disposable income per 
capita -0.01  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.20 
Percentage change in gross state product  -0.02 0.05  0.03  0.06 0.28 
Percentage change in state unemployment   -0.01 -0.05  -0.13 0.10 0.19 
Percentage changes in charitable expenditures  -0.19 0.05  -0.04  0.15 1.16 
          
Private Foundations:           
   Qualifying distributions / required  
   distributions  3.16  1.13  0.97  1.65  9.58 
   Delayed distributions indicator  0.27 0  0  1  0.44 
   Officer compensation / total expenses  0.50 0.53  0.23  0.77 0.29 
   Officer compensation / other  
   employee compensation  4.87 1.68  0.67  4.07  10.90 
   Total revenues (in $millions)  23.98 1.76  0.28  11.68  232.87 
   Total assets (in $millions)  3.16 1.13  0.97  1.65 9.58 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The governance variables are described in Tables 1a and 1b. Charitable expenses are expenses directed towards accomplishing the charitable 
mission rather than for fundraising or administrative activities.  The fundraising indicator is equal to one if the ratio of fundraising expenses to 
donations received is one or greater, and zero otherwise. Officers compensation for charitable purposes is the amount of officers compensation that is 
allocated to activities that accomplish the charitable mission rather than those allocated to fundraising or administrative activities. Program revenues 
are from the sales of products and services.  Qualifying distributions are amounts paid by a foundation that qualify towards meeting the five percent 
payout minimum.  Required distributions are five percent of total assets.  The delayed distribution indictor variable is equal to one of the foundation 
times its payouts such they are as late as possible (i.e., in the following year) and zero otherwise.     34
Table 5 
Effects of Governance on Charitable Organization Operating Efficiency 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ratio of Charitable Expense to Total Expense  Ratio of Charitable Expense to Total Revenue  Fundraising Indicator Variable 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12)    (13) (14) (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
                           
Constant  0.657 0.657 0.671 0.653 0.657 0.654    0.539 0.544 0.556  0.538 0.545 0.540   -2.634 -2.755  -2.863  -2.687 -2.774  -2.713 
  (66.14) (60.40) (88.19) (58.68) (59.90) (58.59)    (46.15) (40.50) (63.69)  (39.43) (40.29) (39.43)   (-10.61) (-10.3) (-13.86)  (-10.08) (-10.16) (-9.92) 
Combined 
Governance 
0.003     0.003      -0.054 
  (3.61)     (3.93)      (-2.55) 
Legal Governance  0.005 0.004    0.005    0.003     -0.074  -0.045 
  (3.17) (2.26)    (2.74)    (1.64)     (-1.80)  (-0.95) 
   Distribution  
   Sub-index 
  0.005  0.005         0.008  0.008   -0.145  -0.143 
    (1.85) (1.89)         (2.07) (2.12)     (-2.05)  (-2.04) 
   Enforcement  
   Sub-index 
  0.004  0.002         0.004  -.001     -0.014  0.061 
    (1.66) (0.65)         (1.04)  (-0.21)     (-0.11)  (0.91) 
Reporting Governance    0.003  0.002  0.002       0.004  0.003   0.004    -0.064  -0.050  -0.062 
    (3.01) (2.23)   (2.29)       (3.58)  (2.90)   (3.14)     (-2.41)  (-2.09)  (-2.51) 
                               
Industry  Effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Size  Controls?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Revenue  Controls?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                               
No. of Observations  51,756  51,756 51,756 51,756 51,756 51,756  51,917 51,917 51,917 51,917 51,917 51,917   24,050 24,050 24,050 24,050  24,050 24,050
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  The specifications in columns 1 through 12 are OLS regressions.  The specifications in columns 13 through 18 are logit regressions.  The dependent variable in columns 1 through 6 is the ratio of 
charitable expenses to total expenses.  The dependent variable in columns 7 through 12 is the ratio of charitable expenses to total revenue.  The dependent variable in columns 13 through 18 is a dummy 
variable set equal to one if the entity is engaged in “excessive fundraising” as defined in the text.  All regression employ industry effects, size controls (total assets) and revenue controls (total revenues).  All 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the entity level.  Governance variables are described in Tables 1a and 1b.   35
Table 6 
Effects of Governance on Charitable Organization Officers’ Compensation 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ratio of Officer’s Compensation to Total Expense  Ratio of Officer’s Comp. to Other Employee 
Compensation 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                    
Constant 0.078  0.071  0.078  0.073  0.071  0.073    0.311  0.304  0.284  0.315  0.305  0.316 
 (16.69)  (13.49)  (22.29)  (13.48)  (13.42)  (13.45)    (13.16)  (11.90)  (16.95)  (11.72)  (11.84)  (11.77) 
Combined 
Governance  -.001     -.005 
 (-1.39)      (-2.83) 
Legal Governance  0.000  0.001    -.008  -.006 
 (0.45)  (1.13)      (-2.23)  (-1.55) 
   Distribution  
   Sub-index   0.001  0.001      -.007  -.007 
     (0.68)  (0.60)        (-.97)  (-1.08) 
   Enforcement  
   Sub-index       0.000  0.001        -.010  -.005 
         (-.10)  (0.73)        (-1.58)  (-0.77) 
Reporting 
Governance     -.001  -.001  -.001        -.005  -.005  -.005 
     (-2.03)  (-2.32)  (-2.29)        (-2.47)  (-2.02)  (-2.03) 
                          
Industry Effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Size Controls?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Revenue  Controls?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y Y  Y  Y Y 
No. of Observations  26,971  26,971  26,971  26,971  26,971 26,971   25,831 25,831  25,831 25,831 25,831  25,831 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  All specifications are OLS regressions.  The dependent variable in columns 1 through 6 is the ratio of officer’s compensation to total expenses.  The 
dependent variable in columns 7 through 12 is the ratio of officer’s compensation to total employee compensation.  All regression employ industry effects, 
size controls (total assets) and revenue controls (total revenues).  All t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the entity level.  
Governance variables are described in Tables 1a and 1b.   36
Table 7 
Effects of Governance on Foundation Payouts 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ratio of Current Year Payout to Prior Year Distributable 
Amount  Delayed Payout Indicator 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                          
Constant  1.355 1.340 1.467 1.316  1.370  1.352    -0.874 -1.025 -0.920 -1.002 -1.024 -1.011 
  (28.30) (20.27) (47.52) (19.93)  (20.17)  (19.90)    (-10.85) (-9.55)  (-18.09) (-9.34) (-9.43) (-9.30) 
Combined Governance  0.020             -0.015       
  (4.84)             (-2.16)       
Legal Governance    0.041   0.030        -0.003    0.016     
    (3.77)   (2.59)        (-0.16)    (0.87)     
   Non-Distribution Sub-
index        0.074  0.071 
 
       -0.001  0.006 
        (3.86)  (3.74)          (-0.03)  (0.17) 
   Enforcement Sub-
index        0.009  -0.013 
 
       -0.005  0.028 
        (0.49)  (-0.69)          (-0.15)  (0.85) 
Reporting Governance     0.021  0.017    0.019      -0.023  -0.025    -0.026 
     (4.11)  (3.08)   (3.47)      (-2.62)  (-2.74)   (-2.76) 
                          
Industry Effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Size Controls?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Revenue Controls?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                          
No. of Observations  38,411  38,411  38,411  38,411  38,411 38,411   28,956  28,956  28,956 28,956 28,956 28,956 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  All specifications are OLS regressions.  The dependent variable in columns 1 through 6 is the ratio current year payouts to the prior year’s distributable amount.  The dependent variable in columns 7 
through 12 is a dummy variable set equal to one if the entity has delayed its payout, as defined in the text.  All regression employ industry effects, size controls (total assets) and revenue controls (total 
revenues).  All t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the entity level.  Governance variables are described in Tables 1a and 1b.       37
Table 8 
Effects of Governance on Foundation Officers’ Compensation 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent Variable:  Ratio of Officer’s Compensation to Total Expense  Ratio of Officer’s Compensation  to Other Employee 
Compensation 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
                          
Constant  0.570 0.632  0.545 0.629  0.620 0.619    6.765 6.715  5.591 7.143  6.361  6.837 
  (50.45) (41.10)  (75.70) (40.91)  (40.12) (40.07)    (37.09) (29.93)  (51.55) (30.68)  (29.58)  (30.97) 
Combined Governance  -0.002             -0.203          
  (-2.41)             (-13.87)          
Legal Governance    -0.015   -0.017         -0.384   -0.281    
    (-5.78)   (-6.05)         (-10.51)   (-7.79)    
   Non- Distribution Sub-
index        -0.031  -0.031           -0.772  -0.706 
        (-6.57)  (-6.61)           (-12.36)  (-11.36) 
   Enforcement Sub-index        0.000  -0.003           -0.011  0.103 
        (-0.05)  (-0.51)          (-0.19)  (1.67) 
Reporting Governance     0.000  0.003    0.002      -0.216  -0.185    -0.187 
     (-0.12)  (2.13)    (1.23)       (-13.10)  (-11.05)    (-9.71) 
                          
Industry  Effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Size  Controls?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Revenue  Controls?  Y Y Y Y Y Y    Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y 
                          
No. of Observations  33,516  33,516  33,516  33,516  33,516  33,516    1,516  1,516  1,516  1,516  1,516  1,516 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  All specifications are OLS regressions.  The dependent variable in columns 1 through 6 is the ratio of officer’s compensation to total expenses.  The dependent variable in columns 7 through 12 is the 
ratio of officer’s compensation to total employee compensation.  All regression employ industry effects, size controls (total assets) and revenue controls (total revenues).  All t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors clustered at the entity level.  Governance variables are described in Tables 1a and 1b.  38
Table 9 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept -1.501  -1.164  -1.680 -0.998 -0.997 
 (-133.0)  (-109.2)  (-119.6)  (-73.8)  (-73.03) 
Legal governance indicator 
variable         -0.002 
         (-0.64) 
Change in donations  0.044      0.020  0.020 
 (38.7)      (14.11)  (14.08) 
Change in donations * governance 
indicator  -0.007     0.001  0.001 
 (-4.02)      (0.58)  (0.47) 
Change in program revenue    0.310    0.200  0.200 
   (112.2)    (47.40)  (47.31) 
Change in program revenue * 
governance indicator   -0.058    -0.054  -0.053 
   (-13.82)    (-9.22)  (-8.96) 
Change in asset sales revenue      0.000  0.000  0.000 
      (0.56) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
Change in asset sales revenue * 
governance indicator      0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (-0.31) (0.33) (0.31) 
          
Year Effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry Effects?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
No. of Observations  41,045  30,363  21,360  15,679  15,680 
R-Squared  0.40  0.62  0.44 0.47 0.47 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  All specifications are OLS regressions.  The dependent variable is the annual percentage change in charitable expenses.  The 
governance indicator variable is equal to 1 if the legal governance variable (the combination of non-distribution and enforcement 
governances) is greater than 6 (its median value) and zero otherwise. Donations are the total donations received by an organization.  Program 
revenues are those from the sales of products and services.  Asset sales revenues are from the sales of assets including investments and 
equipment. All regressions employ industry effects and yearly indicator variables.  T-statistics based on robust standard errors are underneath the 
parameter estimates.   
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Table 10 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.287 0.281 0.698 0.688 0.266 0.263  -1.419  -1.414 
  (15.90) (15.58) (36.31) (35.76) (15.03) (14.87)  (-117.4)  (-117.1) 
Change  in  disposable  income  2.019  2.035        
  (136.0)  (127.3)        
Change in disposable income * 
governance indicator    - 0 . 0 5 4         
    ( - 3 . 1 8 )         
Change in per-capita disposable 
income     3.067  3.096      
     (147.2)  (140.0)      
Change in per-capita disposable 
income * governance indicator        -0.074      
       (-3.30)      
Change in gross state product          1.910  1.928     
      (138.25)  (128.2)    
Change in gross state product * 
governance indicator         -0.049    
           (-3.00)    
Change in state unemployment 
level         -0.709  -0.756 
         (-51.35)  (-48.42) 
Change in state unemployment 
level * governance indicator           0.147 
           (6.430) 
          
Year  Effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  Effects?  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of Observations  40,987  40,989  40,986 40,974 40,986 40,983 41,194 11,008 
R-Squared  0.54 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.41 0.41 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  All specifications are OLS regressions.   The dependent variable is the annual percentage change in charitable expenses for public 
charities.  The governance indicator variable is equal to 1 if the legal governance variable (the combination of non-distribution and 
enforcement governances) is greater than 6 (its median value) and zero otherwise.  All regressions employ industry effects and yearly indicator 
variables.  T-statistics based on robust standard errors are underneath the parameter estimates.   
 